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Talk of law reform is in the air throughout East Asia. 
Whether in Beijing or Tokyo or here, law reform is spoken of in 
terms of strengthening the “Rule of Law.” But what is the Rule of 
Law? Different legal systems have different roads to reach the 
Rule of Law. These different roads are noticeable mainly in the 
different emphases different systems place on two critical ele-
ments in the realization of the Rule of Law State, namely rules and 
the machinery for implementing the rules, i.e., courts and admin-
istrative agencies. The Rule of Law makes demands on both the 
legal rules themselves and on the institutions charged with im-
plementing the law. Fulfillment of the Rule of Law requires both 
rules and institutions. But among those countries that have the 
Rule of Law, there are noticeable differences in how their rules 
and institutions contribute to fulfilling the Rule of Law. 
 While there is considerable knowledge in Taiwan about 
western models of the Rule of Law, Taiwanese scholars who look 
abroad to consider the Rule of Law, should be aware of differ-
ences in how the Rule of Law is implemented among the countries 
they consider as models. The road to the Rule of Law is unique for 
each state. Thus, after exploring the experiences of the German, 
American and Japanese systems, Professor Maxeiner points out 
how infirmities in the Rule of Law necessarily cause you to have 
to choose among roads to the Rule of Law and to suggest how 
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these choices may affect law reform. He would like to s tress that 
these differences among legal methods demonstrate that there is 
no one right road to implement the Rule of Law. Taiwanese re-
formers should not seek for a preferred foreign choice, but to de-




Talk of law reform is in the air throughout East Asia. 
Whether in Beijing or in Tokyo or here, law reform is spoken of in 
terms of strengthening the “Rule of Law.” Scholars from Beijing 
ask whether they can have the Rule of Law without democracy.1 
In Tokyo, the Justice System Reform Council identifies the goal of 
reform as “to transform both the spirit of the law and the rule of 
law into the flesh and blood of this country, so that they become 
‘the shape of our country.” …2 Here in Taiwan scholars consider 
the current state of the Rule of Law as one measure of a political 
and legal transformation to a liberal democratic country.3 
But what is the Rule of Law? The Rule of Law is seen as 
the “very foundation of human rights.”4 It assures that law is 
equally binding on all, prevents arbitrary action, and guarantees a 
realm of freedom and protection of human dignity against tyran-
                                                           
1 See Wei Pan, Toward a Consultative Rule of Law Regime in China, 12 Journal of 
Contemporary China 3 (2003). According to Randall Peerenboom, “Nowadays, it 
is virtually impossible to open any Chinese newspaper without seeing reference 
to rule of law.” China’s Long March Toward Rule of Law 1 (2002). 
2 Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Re-
form Council For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, June 12, 
2001, Chapter I. Available on the Internet at  
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html  (Further in 
Chapter I: “This reform of the justice system aims to tie these various reforms 
together organically under “the rule of law” that is one of the fundamental con-
cepts on which the Constitution is based. Justice system reform should be posi-
tioned as the “final linchpin” of a serious of various reforms concerning restruc-
turing of “the shape of our country.”) 
3 Tsung-fu Chen, The Rule of Law in Taiwan, in The Rule of Law: Perspectives 
from the Pacific Rim, Mansfield Dialogues in Asia 107 (2000). Available on the 
Internet at 
http://www.mcpa.org/rol/09chen.pdf. 
4 Tsung-fu Chen, op. cit., citing Franz Michael, Law: A Tool of Power, Human 
Rights in the People’s Republic of China 33 (1988). 
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nical oppression.”5 In its broadest sense the Rule of Law incorpo-
rates fundamental approaches to structuring society, namely the 
form of economy (e.g., free market) and political system (e.g., lib-
eral democracy).6 So understood just what constitutes the Rule of 
Law is likely to be subject to considerable disagreement. 
The Rule of Law is also used in a narrower sense that em-
phasizes its formal aspects. In this sense the Rule of Law is con-
cerned with those requirements imposed on law at a technical 
level and without regard to its material content. For law to func-
tion satisfactorily as an ordering mechanism in society, it must 
meet these requirements collectively, even if it cannot always meet 
each individually. Here there is an international consensus on the 
essential elements.7 Law should be clear. It should be publicly 
promulgated and prospective. Law should be stable. A mecha-
nism for implementation should permit a predictable decision in 
the individual case. All these requirements help law fulfill an or-
dering role. They make voluntary compliance with the law possi-
ble. Lon Fuller called these requirements “the internal morality of 
law.”8 Gustav Radbruch derived them from the principle of legal 
security of the Rechtsstaat’s concept of law (Rechtsidee).9 
These requirements mean that law can guide those subject 
to it and protect persons subject to the law from the arbitrary use 
of the power to make and apply law. When the Rule of Law is 
safeguarded, subjects can rely on the law and can foresee applica-
tion of state power. The securing of the Rule of Law was an im-
portant concession the bourgeoisie sought from the absolutist 
state; it made economic development possible. For much the same 
reason, people in East Asia and people who do business in East 
Asia promote the Rule of Law. Yet the purpose of the Rule of Law 
is limited. Protection of the Rule of Law in this formal sense only 
                                                           
5 Id. 
6 Randall Peerenboom calls these “thick” theories of Rule of Law. A Government 
of Laws: democracy, rule of law and administrative law reform in the PRC, 12 Journal of 
Contemporary China 45, 51-52 (2003).  
7 Peerenboom, Government, op cit., at 51. He refers to this as a “thin” theory of 
Rule of Law. He seems to express skepticism whether they are really necessary 
for legal systems to function effectively as a system of laws. 
8 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law Chap. 2 (2nd ed. 1969). 
9 Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie § 9 (8th ed. 1973). Translated in The Legal 
Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin (1950). 
Maxeiner: Roads to the Rule of Law -4- Tunghai U. L. Rev. 2003 
 
assures the integrity and the regularity of the application of the 
legal rules as such; it does not assure that these rules serve either 
justice or utility. A state might be governed by the Rule of Law, 
yet be morally bankrupt.10 
Even in a morally exemplary state—perhaps especially in a 
morally exemplary—the Rule of Law should not be an absolute 
value. Its demands all too soon conflict with the ability to general-
ize in rules. At times the Rule of Law gives way to other interests, 
namely to justice or utility (i.e., general welfare). Examples are the 
use of general clauses and of retrospective legislation.11  
Different legal systems have different roads to reach the 
Rule of Law. These different roads are noticeable mainly in the 
different emphases different systems place on two critical ele-
ments in the realization in any Rule of Law State, namely rules 
and the machinery for implementing the rules, i.e., courts and 
administrative agencies. The Rule of Law makes demands on both 
the legal rules themselves and on the institutions charged with 
implementing the law. Fulfillment of the Rule of Law requires 
both rules and institutions. But among those countries that have 
the Rule of Law, there are noticeable differences in how they their 
rules and institutions contribute to fulfilling the Rule of Law.  
While there is considerable knowledge in East Asia about 
western models of the Rule of Law, my impression is that there is 
less awareness of differences in how the Rule of Law is imple-
mented among the various states that have it. This is hardly sur-
prising. Even active participants in international legal relations 
often overlook these differences.12 Frequently in my practice ca-
reer I have seen American lawyers assuming essential similarities 
with European legal systems that do not exist and similarly Euro-
                                                           
10 Lie Junning, Cong fazhiguo dao fazhi (“From Rechtsstaat to rule of law”), in Dony 
Yuyu and Shi Binhai (eds.), Zhengzhi Zhongguo [Political China] at 233 (1988), 
as cited by Peerenboom, Government, op. cit. 52. 
11 See James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Anti-
trust Law: A Comparative Study 12-13 (1986); James Maxeiner, Rechtspolitik und 
Methoden im deutschen und amerikanischen Kartellrecht: eine vergleichende 
Betrachtung Kap. 2 (1986). 
12 See James R. Maxeiner, U.S. “methods awareness” for German Jurists, in Bernhard 
Grossfeld et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Wolfgang Fikentscher 114 (1998); Legal Meth-
ods Awareness and Japan in an Era of Global Electronic Commerce, An Address to the 
Faculty of Law of the Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, June 19, 2003. 
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pean lawyers assuming comparable similarities with American 
systems. In the practice world the result of such misunderstand-
ing may be a disappointed client and a terminated transaction. In 
the world of law reform, it might be a social disaster.   
My point today is that Asian scholars, who look abroad to 
consider the Rule of Law, should be aware of differences in how 
the Rule of Law is implemented among the countries they con-
sider as models. The road to the Rule of Law is unique for each 
state. 
It may be presumptuous for an American law professor to 
address Asian jurists on how they should examine foreign legal 
systems. One thing that has impressed this American law profes-
sor is the depth of interest among Asian law professors in foreign 
law and legal systems. You and your colleagues immerse your-
selves in foreign legal systems as a matter of course. Almost no 
American law professors do that. A colleague of mine pointed out 
that there are far more law professors in Taiwan with German Dr. 
jur. degrees than there are in the United States. You and your col-
leagues are familiar with one or more foreign languages and cul-
tures. Few American law professors know even one language 
other than their native English. You and your colleagues seek to 
learn from foreign legal systems. Few American law professors 
even consider that they might learn from foreign legal systems.13 
As a result of your deep interest in foreign law, you know how 
deceptively similar and yet strikingly different foreign legal sys-
tems can be. What could I add? 
I know little of East Asian legal systems. I know no Asian 
language. But I do know well the two foreign legal systems that 
are most studied here, the German and the American.14 It is my 
                                                           
13 It is quite the contrary in the United States, where provincialism prevails. 
Some sixty-five years ago Karl N. Llewellyn, cautioned against identifying the 
foreign origin of a legal idea for fear that identification with another system 
would kill it in the American. Stefen A. Riesenfeld, Reminiscences of Karl Llewel-
lyn, in Rechtsrealismus, Multikulturelle Gesellschaft und Handelsracht: Karl N. 
Llewellyn und Seine Bedeutung Heute 11, 14 (Ulrich Drobnig & Manfred Reh-
binder eds., 1994).  
14 Cf. Joseph L. Pratt, The Two Gates of National Taiwan University School of Law, 19 
UCLA Pac. Basin L. J. 131, 145 (2001) (noting that on this law faculty, of 53 faculty 
members, nineteen have law degrees from German, eleven from American, ten 
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hope that I can contrast those two systems in a way that will add 
to your understanding of both.  
I shall also be bold enough also to make some remarks 
about that the Japanese legal system. It seems to be—after the 
American and the German systems—the foreign legal system 
most studied here. While I have no first hand knowledge of the 
Japanese legal methods, this past summer, when I had the pleas-
ure of being Visiting Scholar at Kansai University in Osaka Japan, 
I had the opportunity to speak with our colleagues there about 
how the Rule of Law is implemented in Japan. 
What I plan for the next few minutes is to discuss the dif-
ferent roads that the German and American systems take to the 
Rule of Law. I would like to then point out how infirmities in the 
Rule of Law necessarily cause you to have to choose among roads 
to the Rule of Law and to suggest how these choices may affect 
law reform. I would like to stress that these differences among le-
gal methods demonstrate that there is no one right road to imple-
ment the Rule of Law. Your goal should be—as I am sure you all 
recognize—not to select a preferred foreign choice, but to develop 
your own solution that works best here. Your foreign study in-
forms but does not dictate your work.  
 
II. Legal Methods as the Road to the Rule of Law 
 
When we speak about implementing the Rule of Law in a 
formal sense, what we are talking about are legal methods. Legal 
methods are concerned with how one relates an abstract legal idea 
to a factual situation in order to decide a concrete case.15 They in-
clude how one states the law and how one applies it. What I hope 
to make you more aware of are differences in legal methods be-
tween the American Rule of Law State and the German Rechts-
staat. While in substance, the two systems are both firmly dedi-
cated to the Rule of Law,16 the roads that they take to reach the 
                                                                                                                                    
from Japanese, two from French, and one each from English and Swiss universi-
ties.) 
15 See 1 Wolfgang Fiketscher, Die Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darr-
stellung 13 et seq. (1975). 
16 See Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die rule of law, Juristenzeitung 1984, 
65 (finding no material difference between the Rule of Law and the Rechtsstaat). 
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Rule of Law are strikingly different. Their legal methods are not 
the same. Oddly, these legal methods are rarely studied compara-
tively.17 This may explain why foreign legal methods can be so 
easily overlooked. 
Jurists work with their legal methods without thinking 
about them. Karl Llewellyn observed of American jurists that they 
learn handling precedents, i.e., a principal common law legal 
method, as “a matter of tradecraft, an art one learns from experi-
ence. … One learns this from study, from the practice of law, in 
general from life as a lawyer. But little thought is given to what 
one is learning.”18 When an experienced jurist goes abroad to 
study another legal system, this lack of awareness of legal meth-
ods can be dangerous. It is all too easy to substitute for one’s lack 
of knowledge of the foreign system the knowledge that one al-
ready has of one’s own.19 Yet different legal methods may pro-
duce very different results even with very similar substantive 
law.20  
The jurist studying foreign law should begin by studying 
legal methods. The foreign jurist ought to learn what it means to 
think like a jurist in the foreign system.21 But a jurist studying for-
eign law usually has a particular area of law that he or she is anx-
ious to learn about. It is the rare jurist who has the time and inter-
est to tackle the foreign system as system. Moreover, the jurist 
who wants to focus on legal methods in foreign law study is apt to 
encounter frustration. Legal methods are often taught interstitially 
in substantive law courses or in extra-university professional set-
tings rather than in university courses denominated legal meth-
ods.  
 
                                                           
17 The principal exception is Professor Fikentscher’s Methoden des Rechts in 
vergleichender Darstellung (5 vols., 1977-1999). 
18 Karl N. Llewellyn, Präjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika 2 (1933), 
translated as The Case Law System in America 2 (Michael Ansaldi, transl., 1989). 
19 See James Maxeiner, Die Gefahr der Übertragung deutschen Rechtsdenkens auf den 
US-amerikanischen Zivilprozeßrecht, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 
1990, 440. 
20 See, e.g., James Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Anti-
trust Law: A Comparative Study 1986. 
21 See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, 1896 
(1995).  
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III. Different Legal Methods 
 
The German and the American systems use different legal 
methods to realize the Rule of Law. Comparatively speaking, the 
German system places more emphasis on the role of rules while 
the American places more emphasis on the role of courts.  
 
a.  German Legal Methods 
 
 For German jurists there exists an abstract legal order that 
governs all behavior. “The legal order is a structure of ought-
norms. The idea of their message is not to describe facts, but to 
prescribe conduct.”22 This objective order is contrasted to subjec-
tive rights of individual subjects.23 The legal order forms a unity.24 
The norms are interrelated. Taken together they form a system.25 
While it may be that the ideal cannot be realized, nevertheless the 
goal is a system organized as if a single plan governed. Different 
laws should mesh with each other: none should command con-
trary action.26  
The classic subsumption model is at the heart of German 
legal methods.27 A rule of law takes the form of a statement. 
Hence it is called, in German, a Rechtssatz (i.e., “law-sentence”). A 
complete legal norm consists of two parts: a Tatbestand and a legal 
consequence (Rechtsfolge). The Tatbestand is an abstract description 
of a particular situation. The legal norm takes the form: whenever 
the Tatbestand is realized in a concrete factual situation, then a cer-
tain legal consequence applies. This is the major premise. The mi-
                                                           
22 Reinhold Zippellius, Einführung in die juristische Methodenlehre 12 (3rd ed., 
1980) (“The legal order is a structure of ought-norms. The idea of their message is 
not to describe facts, but to prescribe conduct.”) 
23 Fikentscher, op. cit., vol. 1, at 1. Compare Karl Engisch, Einführung in das juri-
stische Denken 24 (7th ed., 1977). 24 (“Legal usage distinguishes between Objec-
tive Right and Subjective Right. Objective Right is the legal order, the aggregate 
of legal rules, the norms, that a few moments ago we formulated as imperatives. 
Subject Right is an entitlement (Berechtigung).” 
24 See Karl Engisch, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung (1935, reprint 1987). 
25 See Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurispru-
denz (1969). 
26 Peter Raisch, Juristische Methoden vom antiken Rom bis zur Gegenwart 148-
49 (1995). 
27 Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 150 (5th ed., 1983). 
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nor premise is that this particular factual situation fulfills the re-
quirements of the Tatbestand, that is, it is a case of the Tatbestand. 
The conclusion then logically follows that for the factual situation, 
the legal consequence applies.  
 In Germany judges apply law to facts. They learn the skill 
of drafting a judgment, the so-called “relationship” or “judgment 
technique” (Relationstechnik or Urteilstechnik). Foreign jurists learn-
ing German law are advised: “A German judgment is supposed to 
appear as an act of an impartial as well as impersonal public 
authority furnishing the official and objective interpretation rather 
than being based on the personal opinions of the deciding justices. 
… The typical German judgment strives after the ideal of deduc-
tive reasoning.” 28  The two principal substantive parts of the 
judgment are the Tatbestand and the grounds for the decision 
(Entscheidungsgründe). The Tatbestand, as it appears in a judgment, 
is a short statement of the parties’ legal claims and assertions of 
fact.29 From the Tatbestand, it should be possible to determine 
quickly who is seeking what, from whom, on what ground and to 
determine which matters are in dispute and which are not.30 The 
grounds for the decision are a summary of the considerations for 
the decision.31 They are to evaluate and subsume the concrete 
facts of the Tatbestand under the abstract elements of the applica-
ble norm.32  
 The highly-stylized German judgment is designed to as-
sure that the parties understand the grounds for the court’s deci-
sion.33 Ideally the judgment will convince the party losing the 
lawsuit that that loss is the correct outcome.34 At a minimum, the 
judgment should persuade the loser that the process was rational. 
The party affected by the judgment should be enabled to ration-
ally reproduce the grounds for the decision. He should recognize, 
                                                           
28 Reinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in Werner 
Ebke & Matthew Finkin (eds.), Introduction to German Law 1, 21 (1996). 
29 ZPO [Zivilprozessordnung] § 313 II; Egon Schneider, Der Zivilrechtsfall in 
Pruefung und Praxis 186 (6th ed., 1974). 
30 Schneider, op. cit. at 185. 
31 ZPO § 313 III. 
32 Guenther Schmitz et al. (eds.), Die Station in Zivilsachen 90 (1986). 
33 Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann, Zivilprozeßordnung § 313, margin 
no. 33 (53d ed., 1995). 
34 Kurt Schellhammer, Die Arbeitsmethode des Zivilichters 241 (7th ed., 1984).  
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that not arbitrariness, but rational argumentation determined the 
judgment.35 In this way the parties are guaranteed the constitu-
tional right to equal treatment under the law (Article 3) and the 
constitutional right to be heard (rechtliches Gehör, Article 103(1)).36 
The judgment also controls the judges.37 If judges fail to subsume 
the facts of the case under the applicable law properly, their deci-
sion is subject to correction on appeal. The judgment demon-
strates whether the judges understood the losing party’s position; 
through its impersonal and colorless nature, it demonstrates the 
judges’ neutrality.38 
 The German legal system approach of an abstract order 
applied to individual cases seeks to eliminate all but pre-
programmed departures from stated legal rules. Rather than per-
mit judges or administrators to depart ad hoc from legal rules, the 
German ideal is to write the norm in such a way as to provide for 
a valuing by the judge or administrator in the individual case. In 
other words, the norm is to grant a bounded discretion to the 
judge to make a decision. That decision may be based either on 
the claims of justice or the needs of public policy in the particular 
case. Where the decision is to be founded on interests of public 
policy, that decision should be subject to political control.39 
 
b.   American Legal Methods 
 
The American legal system emphasizes judicial process 
more than rules. The American legal system is expected to pro-
vide procedures to resolve disputes about what subjective rights 
are. The focus of American legal method is dispute resolution.  
  Rule skepticism dominates American legal thinking and 
legal instruction. A half century ago, Professor and later U.S. At-
torney General Edward Levi in the classic work on legal method 
in the United States, denied that the subsumption model applies 
                                                           
35 Peter Raisch, Juristische Methoden vom antiken Rom bis zur Gegenwart 121 
(1995). 
36 Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann ZPO § 313, margin no. 33. 
37 Schellhammer, op. cit. at 242; Schmitz et al. op. cit. at 83. 
38 Schneider, op. cit. at 178-79. 
39 See James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Anti-
trust Law, op. cit., passim. 
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in America: “[i]t cannot be said that the legal process is the appli-
cation of known rules to diverse facts.”40 According to my Dok-
torvater Fikentscher, “there is no American teaching of subsump-
tion of facts under a norm is, because no memorandum (Gutach-
ten) and judgment technique have been developed.”41 Far from 
developing a theory that subsumes facts under law, Anglo-
American civil procedure, that is, that branch of the legal system 
where law is necessarily applied to facts, is concerned with sepa-
rating law from facts. The purpose of this separation is to permit 
two different decision-makers to decide two different kinds of 
questions, namely judges to decide questions of law and lay juries 
to decide questions of fact.  
In modern American litigation, the judge determines the 
legal rules, while the jury finds the facts and applies the legal rules 
to these facts.42 The judge thus is the law-giver and not the law-
applier. American judges seem to like it that way for it permits 
them to make policy.43 It is this creative function in law-giving 
that has so fascinated legal scholars around the world. 
 The jury finds the facts and applies the law to the facts, af-
ter the parties have presented their case and the judge has in-
structed the jury in the applicable law. The jury is to evaluate the 
parties’ evidence and determine whether the party seeking relief 
has established each and every element of each and every cause of 
action raised. The reality is, however, frequently different. Juries 
often do not comprehend the elements of causes of action and 
may just decide for the party they favor.44  
                                                           
40 Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 3 (1949). 
41 Fikentscher, op. cit., vol. 2, at 262. He attributes this to an absence of a theory 
that covers both case law and statute law. Case law results from decision of con-
crete disputes between parties. By its nature, it focuses on the substantive claims 
in the individual cases. Statute law, on the other hand, partakes more of the form 
of a command and is, therefore, more formalistic. 
42 See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60-61, 64 n. 25b. 
(2d Cir. 1948) (Jerome Frank, J.). 
43 See Posner, op. cit., p. 34-35 and Charles Wyzanski, Whereas—A Judge’s Prem-
ises 6 (1965). 
44 See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., op. cit.; C. May, Perspectives on 
Judicial Speech: “What Do We Do Now?: Helping Juries Apply the Instructions, 28 
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 869 (1995) (with copious further references). 
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In any event, how a given jury actually does apply law to 
facts in a give case is unknown. The jury’s verdict is “general,” 
that is, it is merely a statement of decision. The German equivalent 
would be a judgment that consisted solely of the formal statement 
of the judgment (Urteilsformel). The jury’s decision is, as Jerome 
Frank put it, “as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as the 
judgment which issued from the ancient oracle of Delphi.”45 Be-
cause of the general nature of the verdict, errors in determination 
of facts, understanding law of, or application of law to facts 
largely cannot be determined46 and usually cannot be corrected 
on appeal. American appeals do not consider whether the deci-
sion of the lower court was correct, but whether the procedure 
followed there was proper and whether the law was properly 
stated. “If the American jury system promises anything, it is not a 
fair outcome, only a fair process.”47   
 Thus the American legal system places great weight on 
values related to the fairness of the process. It is especially con-
cerned that the parties have notice of all proceedings; that the 
judge and the jury are completely neutral and unprejudiced; that 
no proceedings take place without all parties’ having the oppor-
tunity to be involved; and above all, that each party has a full, fair 
and ample opportunity to present “its case”, i.e., its version of the 
whole matter. These factors legitimate the proceeding.  
This emphasis on process is accompanied by an emphasis 
that decision makers should reach fair decisions. That means that 
often their decisions are at odds with a rule. Much of American 
legal theory is concerned with upholding departures from rules. 
One characteristic of the American legal system is said to be the 
“open modification of the rule to allow purposes or policies to be 
taken into account.”48 Fikentscher has noted the positive side of 
                                                           
45 Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60. 
46 Id. 61. 
47 Schlesinger/Bradley, CBS Reports: Enter the Jury Room, first broadcast April 
16, 1997 (transcript and video tape available). 
48 P.S. Attiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American 
Law 91 (1987). Roscoe Pound advocated an “equitable application of the law” 
which conceived of the legal rule “as a general guide to the judge, leading him 
toward the just result, but insist[ing] that within wide limits he should be free to 
deal with the individual case, so as to meet the demands of justice between the 
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this approach to rules: “The program is not rule antagonism, but 
flexibility of rules and adaptability of the system in order to meet 
… the need of the hour.”49 There are many areas in American law 
where there are “legitimate departures from rules,” e.g., “jury nul-
lification” (where juries are permitted to decide against the law) 
and “prosecutorial discretion” (where prosecutors are permitted 
to decide when to enforce laws).50 American legal scholars see 
these departures from rules as virtues that permit decision makers 
to take into account individual circumstances that would be insuf-
ficiently appreciated by rule-bound decisions.51 
The focus of the American legal system on process tends to 
make difficult legal consideration of those countless smaller mat-
ters that make up daily life. Process is expensive. The model for 
process is a formal proceeding: ideally, adversary presentation 
before a jury. Only the most important matters can count on get-
ting such treatment. However much one admires adversary pres-
entation and jury trial, one must acknowledge that adversary 
presentation and jury trial are features of only a small percentage 
of cases subject to litigation. The vast majority of cases in the for-
mal system of litigation—well over 90%—settle without a jury 
ever being impaneled or a judge ever taking testimony. Moreover, 
most legal decisions never involve litigation at all. The persons 
subject to rules apply the rules to themselves or those charged 
with implementing rules enforce them without formal hearings. 
The American legal system deals imperfectly, if at all, with these, 
                                                                                                                                    
parties and accord with the general reason of ordinary men.” The Scope and Pur-
pose of Sociological Jurisprudence III, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 515 (1912). 
49 Fikentscher, op. cit., vol. 2 at 465.  
50 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 148, 153 (1996). 
51 See, e.g., Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A 
Study of Lawful Departures from Legal Rules (1973); Sunstein, op. cit., substan-
tially incorporating Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953 
(1995) (“One of my principal goals in this Article is to respond to a pervasive 
social phenomenon: extravagant enthusiasm for rules and an extravagantly rule-
bound conception of the rule of law.”); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 
Stan. L. Rev. 633, 634 (1995) (“at times it is better not to give reasons than to give 
them”); Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 180 (1982) 
(“One should recognize openly that courts are exercising the power to allocate 
legislative inertia and to decide whether statutes deserve a retentionist or a revi-
sionist bias.”). 
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the most numerous of all legal decisions.52 Mostly these decisions 
are controlled, if all, by the possibility that some of them might be 
subject to a formal process. 
 
c.  Japanese Legal Methods 
 
When I turn to Japanese legal methods, I am an outsider 
looking in. I am dependent on the observations of others. The 
outward form of Japanese legal methods is very close to that of 
German methods. Reading Japanese scholars on Japanese civil 
procedure and legal methods, one might assume that there is a 
very close congruence.53 Much as in Germany, judges are trained 
in a technique of writing judgments to apply law to facts.   
A German scholar, Gutram Rahn, however takes issue 
with this view. Rahn concludes that Japanese jurists have rejected 
the German legal-subsumption method.54 In its place, he says, 
there is a method that is distinctly Japanese. Rahn’s fundamental 
contention is that a legal judgment in Japanese understanding 
consists of two separate and independent acts. There is first an act 
of decision (Entscheidungsakt); it consists of a value judgment of all 
competing interests. Only after reaching that decision is the court 
then to justify that decision in its judgment in a separate act of jus-
tification (Entscheidungsbegründung). Unclear according to Rahn is 
the extent to which the court in justifying its decision is to explain 
and support its initial value judgment, who should win.55 The 
                                                           
52 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (1969). 
53 See, e.g., Muneo Nakamura, My Theory about Judgment, first published in 1965, 
and A Comparative Study of Judicial Process, first published in 1958, both reprinted 
in Hideo Nakamura (ed.), Muneo Nakamura, Collected Works on Civil Proce-
dure (1994); Hideo Nakamura, Die japanische ZPO in deutscher Sprache Mit 
einer Einführung in das japanische Zivilprozeßrecht (1978). 
54 Gutram Rahm, Rechtsdenken und Rechtsauffasung in Japan Dargestellt an der 
Entwicklung der modernen japanischen Zivilrechtsmethodik 2 (1990).  
55 Id. at 327 („Die moderne japanische Zivilrechtsmethodik umfaßt zwei vonein-
ander unabhängige Verfahrensschritte: den Entscheidungsakt und die Entschei-
dungsbegründung. Die Entscheidung selbst wird durch ein Werturteil getroffen 
dem eine Abwägung aller vom Rechtsstreit berührten Interessen vorangeht. Das 
Gesetz ist dabei nur ein unverbindliches Kriterium neben anderen. Entscheidend 
kommt es darauf an, daß das Werturteil dem gesunden Menschen verstand des 
japanischen Volkes entspricht. Im zweiten Verfahrensschritt wird die bereits 
getroffene Entscheidung als Mittel der Überzeugung aufgrund des Gesetzes juri-
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court’s value judgment, according to Rahn,56 is not to be an arbi-
trary decision. The judge is to weigh the interests of the parties to 
the lawsuit and of other parties interested to reach the correct con-
clusion. The written law is, in this decision, only one aspect of the 
harmony that is to be sought. The decision must not contradict the 
general understanding of the people (gesunden Menschenverstand 
des Laien—shiroto no joshiki—素人の常識).57 Whether the court is 
to lay open this value judgment explicitly is debated.58 
Other German scholars that are familiar with Japan agree 
with Rahn.59 An American, who presumably is not familiar with 
German legal methods, also supports Rahn’s thesis. Carl F. 
Goodman is his new book, The Rule of Law in Japan: A Compara-
tive Analysis, observes that frequently in Japanese law, “what 
you see is not what you get.” According to Goodman, Japanese 
judges are to decide in “a way that is satisfactory to the Japanese 
public—in a manner consistent with cultural values, myths (if 
need be), and societal norms that may be different from norms 
that exist in the United States. … To be consistent with these val-
ues, a decision may not reflect a syllogistic analysis of abstract 
logic. A decision must take account of the circumstances in 
which the parties presently find themselves and legal rules must 
be pliable to reflect the context in which the parties and the rule 
exist.”60  
                                                                                                                                    
stisch konstruiert. Unklar bleibt, in welchem Unfang die ‚substantiellen’ Ent-
scheidungsgründe—Interessenabwägung und Werturteil—offenzulegen sind. 
Die Forderung nach Offenlegung wird im Prinzip erhoben, aber dem Überzeu-
gungszweck der Begründung untergeordnet.“) 
56 Id. at 366. 
57 Id. at 327. 
58 Id. at 345. 
59 See, e.g., Axel Schwarz, Vom Wert des Lebens und der Normen, in Heinrich 
Menkhaus (ed.), Das Japanische im japanischen Recht 63, 76-77 (1994) („Die Be-
trachtung zum Zivilrecht: Allgemeiner Teil und Schuldrecht bestätigt den Be-
fund Gutram Rahns zur Methode der japanischen Rechtspraxis: Die Rechtsan-
wendung wird nicht durch die Wertung des Gesetzeswortlauts, sondern durch 
das Werturteil des Richters determiniert. Entscheidungsfindung und Rechtrferti-
gung der Entscheidung fallen auseinander. Ein richterliches Bedürfniss, eine 
Entscheidung juristisch unter Berufung auf eine Vorschrift sozusagen zu unter-
mauern, scheint nicht zu geben.“)  
60 Carl S. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis 2, 4 
(2003) (“But to Japanese judges, whose experience is fundamentally different 
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Last summer in Japan I found little support for Rahn’s 
thesis, either in theory or practice. Most Japanese jurists with 
whom I spoke insisted that Japanese judges are bound by the 
law and do not feel compelled first to make separate extra-legal 
value decisions. They told me that the national Legal Training 
and Research Institute does not teach that judges are first to 
evaluate the overall merits of the case outside the law, but 
teaches judgment techniques similar to German techniques.61 
Japanese law professors  informed me that in their classes they 
do not teach rule skepticism, but that the rules are binding and 
that judges decide according to these rules. 
Nevertheless a couple of Japanese colleagues granted that 
Rahn’s thesis just possibly might have some merit in civil proce-
dure. They hastened to add that it has no application to criminal 
                                                                                                                                    
from the American experience, the discretion is to be exercised in a way that is 
satisfactory to the Japanese public—in a manner consistent with cultural values, 
myths (if need be), and societal norms that may be different from norms that 
exist in the United States. To be consistent with these values, a decision may not 
reflect a syllogistic analysis of abstract logic. A decision must take account of the 
circumstances in which the parties presently find themselves and legal rules 
must be pliable to reflect the context in which the parties and the rule exist.” Fur-
ther, “ …. [J]udges are now being asked to interpret laws, Codes and Constitu-
tions written by other societies with other values and, in a sense forced on Japa-
nese society. When these Codes, Constitutions and laws are deemed to conflict 
with fundamental Japanese values or with Japanese historic norms or with myths 
accepted by the Japanese it is natural for judges to read these laws in a way 
which is consistent with these norms, values and myths. More is involved here 
than a strained interpretation of words. If need be a wholesale re-writing of the 
law by the judge may be called for and written provisions of the law will be sac-
rificed for the ‘greater Japanese’ good.”)   
61 Cf. Akira Ishikawa, Training, Appointment and Number of Judges, in Gott-
fried Baumgaertel, Grundprobleme des Zivilprozessrechts Band 2 (Japanisches 
Recht Band 19) 3-5 (1985) (describing the training received by judges); Jun’ichi 
Murakami, Argumentation und Abwaegung, in Heinrich Menkhaus (ed.), op. cit., at 
89, 90 (criticicizing the Rahn thesis: „Liegt die Absicht der ‚Strukturierenden 
Rechtslehre’ darin, die Erzeugung der Rechtsnorm als ‚rechtsstaatlich rückge-
bundenen Prozeß’ zu begreifen, so wäre sie in der japanischen Rechtspraxis nicht 
liecht zu verwirklichen, in der nach Schwarz ‚gesunder Menschenverstand’ und 
‚außerrechtliche Argumente’ eine entscheidene Rolle spielen. Im Gestalt des ja-
panischen Richters einen ‚Rechtsbearbeiter’ im Sinne der ‚Strukturierenden 
Rechtslehre’ zu finden, wäre dann ohne Zweifel unmöglich. Der Richter würde 
vielmehr stets im normgelösten Raum bewegen, den die ‚Strukturierende Rechts-
lehre’ möglichst begrenzen will.“).   
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procedure, which is subject to the strict rule of nulla crime sine 
lege. And while I have yet to find a Japanese scholar who has 
published a direct response in English or German to Rahn,62 I 
have found some publications by Japanese scholars in European 
languages that do tend to support Rahn’s conclusions. Takeyoshi 
Kawashima of the University of Tokyo in an address in the 
United States was directly supportive of Rahn’s analysis of Japa-
nese legal methods. He told Americans that: “ In Japan it is un-
derstood from the beginning of a legal enactment that the mean-
ing of law is changeable and not definite. This appears to be a 
peculiarly Japanese characteristic of legal thinking.”63  Kawa-
shima added a very interesting criticism: “this semantic tradition 
is Japan is really contradictory to the basic values which are re-
quired for a modern, democratic society which needs predictable 
judicial decisions. Sooner or later we will have to change our 
traditional attitude toward the meaning of words, especially in 
our laws.” 
  
IV.  Why the Road to the Rule of Law Matters 
 
 Recognition that there are different roads to the Rule of 
Law can help find a way that works best in Taiwan. It can help 
you recognize the strengths and weaknesses of foreign models 
and help you identify whether the foreign model might make 
sense here. Moreover, it may help you chart a course that in one 
area takes one route while a different way in another.  
 Your choice of roads to the Rule of Law, i.e., the legal 
methods you emphasize, has an obvious and immediate impact 
on basic elements of the legal system. In drafting laws and pro-
cedures, will you emphasize individualization of justice or con-
sistency? In applying the laws, will you emphasize the fairness 
of the procedure or the correctness of the outcome? In training 
                                                           
62 The closest comment in that direction I have found is that of Jur’ichi Mura-
kami, op. cit. 
63 Takeyoshi Kawashima, Japanese Way of Legal Thinking, International Journal of 
Law Libraries 127, 131 (1979). Cf. Rahn, op. cit. at 18, 352; Yamanaka, op. cit. at 235 
(“In Japan herrscht immer noch die Vorstellung, daß das Gesetz für die Ausle-
gung nur eine Fassade bilde. An sich sei das Gesetz nur unnützer Schmuck, es 
lebe erst in der Handhabung durch den Menschen.“).  
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legal professionals to implement this system, will you focus on 
the role of advocate or the role of judge?  
 Each of these subjects is material for a talk in itself. I 
would prefer, however, in the few minutes I have left, not to 
consider these subjects, but to point out that these choices are 
inevitable because of the limits of the Rule of Law. I would like 
to suggest circumstances under which one or the other road 
might be preferable. 
The collective requirements of the Rule of Law—no mat-
ter which road you take—cannot be absolutes. All too soon they 
conflict with the ability to generalize in rules. Radbruch ob-
served the tension: “Legal security requires positive law, but 
positive law demands application without regard to its justice or 
utility.”64 Even were knowledge of the present perfect, complete 
predictability would flounder on the rock of the problem of law 
in time. “Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still.”65 
“The more law is laid down in precise statutory paragraphs, the 
faster it goes out of date.”66 Slavish attention to the Rule of Law 
would be concentration on the ordering function of law to the 
exclusion of law’s other functions in the realization of justice and 
in the promotion of the general welfare.  
The Rule of Law must at times give way. Or, looked at in 
another way, the Rule of Law must provide a mechanism to deal 
with the problem of law over time and the inevitable infirmities 
of legal rules. The Rule of Law must allow for law at times to be 
less clear, less predictable and less reliable so that questions of 
equity and policy and changes in time can be accommodated. 
Thus, even in a state totally oriented on the Rule of Law, there 
needs to be a legitimizing mechanism to reach decisions that 
cannot be encompassed by specific rules.67 
                                                           
64 Radbruch, op. cit., at 166. 
65 Roscoe Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 1 (1923). 
66 Oskar Adolf Germann, Rechtssicherheit, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Straf-
recht, 49, 257 (1935), reprinted in Oskar Adolf Germann, Methodische Grundfra-
gen 54, 55 (1946). 
67 Wei Pan, op. cit. at 9, argues that “Democracy emphasizes law making, laws are 
only fair when they are made with a relative majority’s agreement. Rule of law 
emphasizes law enforcement as long as it is ‘constitutional’, namely, made in ac-
cordance with the basic law.” But a Rule of Law state cannot divorce itself from 
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A great strength of the American legal method is that it 
can quickly deal with new and unforeseen issues. Individuals, 
on their own, in the context of dispute resolution, can raise these 
issues and compel decision. Process can substitute for rules. 
Rules can be bent when a legitimate need arises. Often a full 
hearing of both sides and a strictly neutral decision maker serve 
well to legitimate the individual decision. The decision maker 
chooses between the respective equities discussed before it. 
This flexibility in confronting new matters leads to a great 
weakness of the American legal method. Even basic issues may 
never be fully resolved; they can be argued anew with each new 
application. Moreover, the very expense of adversary presentation 
assures that only the tiniest fraction of all legal issues will ever 
enjoy the application of the model. Those issues that do enjoy full 
adversary presentation may find themselves overwhelmed by the 
process and by what Roscoe Pound called the “sporting theory of 
justice, where “[t]he inquiry is not, what do substantive law and 
justice require … [but have]  the rules of the game been carried 
out strictly.”68  
A great strength of German legal method is its ability to 
place a wide variety of factual situations consistently within a sys-
tematic whole. It well identifies decision makers and gives them 
criteria for decision. It can separate out legal decisions that should 
be made based on objective determinations from policy decisions 
that require political responsibility. Not surprisingly, Germany is 
the home of the systematic code. The code informs the citizens of 
how to conduct their lives even as it instructs judges and adminis-
trators how to decide cases. Thus it is well able to provide a 
mechanism for implementing a specific legal order. But there is a 
resulting weakness: rule dependence. When no rule is available, 
the course of decision is more difficult. If a legal rule is available, 
it can be hard to depart from it even when equity or policy might 
require it.  
                                                                                                                                    
law making, even in the process of law enforcement. It must have a legitimizing 
mechanism when the rule cannot be laid out beforehand. 
68 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
Justice, originally published 1906, reprinted in 35 Federal Rules Decisions 273, 291 
(1964). 
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 Elsewhere69 I have pointed out—following Radbruch—
that there are two different types circumstances under which the 
Rule of Law may have to give way for other interests: namely jus-
tice (i.e., equity in the individual case) and policy (i.e., the general 
welfare of society).  
The American method of adversary presentation works 
best when it is concerned with purely private concerns and the 
equities between two parties. It works considerably less well 
when confronted with questions of policy. Nearly a century ago 
Pound criticized the American method because it “tr[ies] ques-
tions of the highest social import as mere private controversies 
…”70 In such cases the decision maker must make a policy deci-
sion that takes into accounts interests not before it. The answer 
called for may be subject to no objective standards and be defensi-
ble only as a political choice. Yet judges are not chosen to make 
political decisions. 
German methods—when the political system is function-
ing—may be better suited to resolve policy issues. They can pro-
vide for taking into account interests before the decision maker 
and for interests not there represented. They can guide the deci-
sion maker, but bind the decision maker to political responsibility 
as well.  
Of course, one of the reasons that American courts often 
undertake policy decisions is because the legislature has de-
faulted. The willingness to permit American courts to undertake 
these decisions also permits American legislatures to legislate be-
fore they have reached the optimal solution. Thus it seems that the 
United States is faster with a solution—legislative or judge-
made—yet never is able to get it completely right. Germany is 
slower with a solution, but once it has one, is able to implement it 
consistently and smoothly.  
When law reformers make a law, they should recognize 
whether they need to leave room in the statute for persons 
charged with applying the law to make policy or equity decisions. 
Where positive law cannot deliver a demonstrable decision, re-
formers should remember that independent judges who are not 
                                                           
69 James Maxeiner, Policy, op cit. 
70 Roscoe Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law?, 5 Columbia Law Review 339, 
346 (1905). 
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politically responsible are better guided by justice than by policy. 
The equity of the individual case, built on a thorough investiga-
tion of the facts, is the best basis for a reasonable judge-made law.  
Policy decisions, on the other hand, can be better made when they 
are recognized as such, are made by institutions created to make 
policy decisions, and are reached by decision makers who can ap-
peal to political responsibility at a basis for their decisions. 
